This was undoubtedly one of the most thrilling 1500m finals in Olympic history—perhaps the most thrilling of all time. While Cole Hocker rightfully claimed victory for the USA, the race’s status as a classic was solidified by the fact that Britain’s Josh Kerr, the USA’s Yared Nuguse, and Norway’s Jakob Ingebrigtsen all had the potential to win with slightly altered tactics.
Ingebrigtsen’s fast start was too aggressive. Nuguse allowed Hocker to slip ahead on the back straight, while Kerr found himself too wide at a crucial moment when he sought victory. In a competition defined by narrow margins, different pacing strategies and the unique characteristics of the Stade de France track played pivotal roles in creating this memorable race.
Championship races require
‘robots’ to think independently
In contrast to most Diamond League races that feature pacemakers and Wavelight technology (an LED-based pace-setting system), athletes at the Olympics must rely on their own instincts. “It’s usually quite mechanical,” explains Matt Yates, a former British Olympic 1500m runner and elite coach. “The introduced efficiency from super spikes and light technology has led many runners to adopt a very consistent rhythm in their strides. But at the Olympics, it’s different. With no pacemakers or guiding lights, athletes must fend for themselves.”
What mistakes did Ingebrigtsen make?
Many spectators were surprised by Ingebrigtsen’s rapid pace, completing the first lap in 54.82 seconds and the 800m in 1:51. For Yates, the issue wasn’t just the speed; it was the lack of even pacing over the two laps. “Ingebrigtsen is typically very efficient with his energy. However, his performance diminished in the final,” Yates notes. “That 54.82 was detrimental, causing significant physiological changes. He could have benefited from running a couple of laps around 55 seconds instead.”
Why did Ingebrigtsen choose
to take the lead early?
Recognizing his own superior speed, Ingebrigtsen also understood that Kerr was faster over the last 200m, as demonstrated during last year’s world championships. “Ingebrigtsen doesn’t possess a strong finishing kick,” Yates points out. “He bolted at the first lap due to the pressure of the event. Kerr clearly affected his mindset.”
Was Kerr wise to stay on
Ingebrigtsen’s shoulder?
Yates isn’t entirely convinced – and he raises concerns about the Stade de France track. “Although the track allows for fast times, its narrow turns aren’t the easiest to navigate. You cannot simply run on someone’s shoulder in the bends, which is a lesson Josh learned the hard way. The curves are tight, and the straights are relatively long.”
Is riding on the leader’s shoulder
generally advantageous?
Not necessarily. “I’m not a fan of that position,” Yates states. “I refer to it as ‘the schoolkid’s position’. Running close to the leader can push you onto the white line or even into lane two, meaning you’d end up covering a longer distance.”
What strategies should middle- and
long-distance runners adopt?
Yates contends that the strategy employed by Ingebrigtsen and Hocker—staying close to the inside lane—was the most effective approach until Ingebrigtsen attempted a block on Kerr in the final 100m. “Positioning is crucial on this track,” Yates remarks. “No one can successfully pass just off the leader’s shoulder in the last turn; they must drop back slightly and launch their attack later than usual on the straight. That’s exactly what Hocker executed flawlessly in the last 20 meters.”
